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FLIGHT RECORDINGS AS EVIDENCE IN
CIVIL LITIGATION
PAUL DELORY*
INTRODUCTION
Although advanced technology has brought commercial avia-
tion to the threshhold of the supersonic age, recent headlines reveal
that modern aircraft are still subject to such things as pilot error and
mechanical failure. In addition to these factors, the increasing speed
and altitude at which modem aircraft operate can produce tragic
results-major air disasters with attendant loss of life.
In the event of such a disaster, both the flight data recorder and
the cockpit voice recorder are invaluable tools for determining the
cause of the accident. But the value of these recorders, however, is
by no means limited to investigative purposes. The information
obtained from these recorders can serve another useful purpose in
the litigation that would follow a major accident. The information
may establish who was at fault and could be a key evidentiary factor
ultimately to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties.
But an attempt to introduce into evidence the information ob-
tained from these recorders poses many problems for the litigant.
The problems which are presented and the possible solutions to
those problems are the subject of this article.
THE FLIGHT RECORDER AND COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER: DESCRIPTION,
USE, AND IMPORTANCE
The increasing speed and altitude at which modem jet aircraft
operate and the tremendous impact of a crash make the possibility
of surviving witnesses remote at best. In addition, the total or near
total destruction of the aircraft and the death of the crew spurred
the U.S. governmental agencies to develop regulations requiring the
installation of flight recorders in jet aircraft.' The need for the addi-
tional and valuable information which the flight recorders could
supply became readily apparent since investigators often have few
clues on which to make their determinations as to the cause of the
disaster from the twisted, scattered and burning wreckage:
* J.D., Boston College School of Law, 1975.
1. See Speiser, Airplane Flight Recorders: A New Source of Evidence, 2 FORUM 97
(1967).
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Before the advent of suitable recording devices, only a post-
mortem analysis of the wreckage and interviews of any
available survivors or eye-witnesses could be used to search
for the clues of such a tragedy. It is, therefore, only natural
that ways were sought to record events leading to such acci-
dents and to preserve such records for thorough analysis.2
In 1957, the Civil Aeronautics Board made the first response to
this increasing need for an additional investigative aid by adopting
amendments to the Civil Air Regulations and requiring that flight
recorders be installed in all jet aircraft over 12,500 pounds and oper-
ating above 25,000 feet.3
The flight recorder' is a small recording device that is installed
in the aircraft for the purpose of receiving and recording on a rotat-
ing tape the impressions made by five styli from information elec-
tronically transmitted from various aircraft systems.' The regula-
tions provide that the information recorded indicate the time, alti-
tude, airspeed, vertical acceleration, and heading.' These recorder
records must be retained for at least sixty days,7 and the recorder
must be activated the instant the plane commences its takeoff roll
2. Panel, Voice Recorders and Flight Recorders, 36 J. Am. L. & COMM. 475 (1970)
[Hereinafter referred to as Panel]. The cited article is one of many useful and informative
articles comprising a symposium on several important aspects of aviation procedure, investi-
gation and litigation.
3. Prior to 1958 the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) had authority over both accident
investigation and the establishment of aviation regulations. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970), transferred the regulatory function of the CAB to the newly
created Federal Aviation Agency, while the CAB retained its investigatory functions. This
delegation of authority was in effect until 1966 when Congress passed the Department of
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1651 et seq. (1970), which amended the earlier Federal
Aviation Act. The Department of Transportation Act § 6(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1655(c) (1970),
declares that the regulatory Federal Aviation Agency was renamed the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and transferred to the Department of Transportation. Section 6(d) of
the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1655(d) (1970), transferred the investiga-
tory function of the CAB to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the Depart-
ment of Transportation. See generally Panel, supra note 2, at 475-76.
4. The flight recorder is also frequently referred to as the flight data recorder or foil.
5. See Speiser, Airplane Flight Recorders and Related Devices, in 20 AM. JuR. PROOF
OF FAcTs 575, 578 (1968). This article describes the highly technical installation, durability
and data collection requirements which the regulations have prescribed for these flight recor-
ders.
6. 14 C.F.R. § 121.343(a)(1) (1974).
7. 14 C.F.R. § 121.343(d) (1974).
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and continue until it has completed its landing roll.' In 1970, the
FAA amended the existing regulations to expand the recording ca-
pacity beyond the five parameters mentioned above.' It was pro-
vided that after September 18, 1973, such additional data as pitch,
acceleration angle, flap control and position should also be re-
corded.' 0
But even with this expanded capacity the flight recorder may
still be unable to indicate what factors contributed to the crash.
Although it was a milestone in unveiling the mysteries surrounding
the crash, one author recognized:
Still it is a mechanical device and although it can retrace
the movements of an aircraft with amazing accuracy, it
tells nothing of the human element, the actions of the crew
and passengers during the fateful few minutes prior to such
occasions. I
An additional device was needed; one which would provide the in-
vestigators with supplemental information, and thus, assist them in
narrowing down the number of probable causes involved in the acci-
dent. After several years of conducting studies, the Federal Aviation
Agency, as it was then called, determined that the recording of
spoken words of the flight crew during the flight of an aircraft was
feasible. As a result, regulations were issued 2 prescribing that all
planes which were equipped with flight recorders also be required
to install cockpit voice recorders. 3
The cockpit voice recorder, like the flight recorder, is subject
to stringent federal regulations pertaining to installation and dura-
bility. The cockpit data recorder
must be able to record each crew member's conversation
with ground facilities and all conversations on the air-
8. 14 C.F.R. § 121.343(b) (1974).
9. Department of Transportation Act, § 6(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1655(c) (1970), amending
Federal Aviation Act § 313(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1354(a) (1958). This section empowers the Admin-
istrator to conduct investigations, issue orders and to make and amend rules, regulations and
procedures, pursuant tothe provisions of the Act.
10. 14 C.F.R. § 121.343(a)(2) (1974).
11. Panel, supra note 2, at 478.
12. 14 C.F.R. § 25.1457 (1974); 14 C.F.R. § 121.359 (1974).
13. See Panel, supra note 2, at 479.
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plane's intercommunication system. Most important, di-
rect conversation between crew members in the cockpit had
to be recorded. The recorder must be able to retain the last
30 minutes of each conversations; it must also contain pro-
visions to prevent accidental erasure of such recordings
after a crash and of course it must survive the severe condi-
tions encountered by modem jet aircraft. . . . The four
available recording channels are assigned to record all crew
conversations within the cockpit and to record the conver-
sations of the first, second and third crew member with
ground radio facilities or over the aircraft communications
system. ' 4
Presently the FAA records all communications from an aircraft
to the control tower twenty-four hours a day. In the event of an
accident these tapes are rerecorded and transcripts made of the
pertinent communications. The original is preserved for five years.'5
The cockpit voice recorder is intended to act as a supplement rather
than a replacement to these ground based recorders by covering
crew conversations. This supplemental recorder, therefore, provides
evidence which might have heretofore been lost.
At times, a pilot who is aware of the nature of an emergency
that has put his aircraft in danger is too preoccupied with
an attempted recovery to radio an explanation to a ground
station. The conversation between the pilots and flight en-
gineers, however, or the orders issued by the pilot in com-
mand to his other crew members may contain valuable in-
formation relating to the cause of the accident.'"
Thus, the cockpit voice recorder is by far the most conclusive instru-
ment that has so far been made available. 17
14. Id. The cited passage has summarized the numerous technical requirements per-
taining to the cockpit voice recorder in 14 C.F.R. § 25.1457 (1974).
15. See Crocker, Admissibility of FAA Tape Recordings in Aviation Accident
Litigation, 35 INs. CouNsm J. 259 (1968); Speiser, Airline Passenger Death Cases, in 8 AM.
Jun. Trials § 173 (1965).
16. Speiser, Airplane Flight Recorders and Related Devices, in 20 Am. Jun. PROOF OF
FACTS 568, 593 (1968).
17. The use of the cockpit voice recorder simultaneously with the flight data recorder
allows federal investigators to develop a much clearer picture of events prior to an accident.
See Panel, supra note 2, at 484-85.
[Vol. 9
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The recovery of both the flight and the cockpit voice recorder
is of prime importance when the investigation of an airline crash
commences. 18 As soon as the operator of an aircraft is involved in
an accident," the Bureau of Aviation Safety of the National Trans-
portation Safety Board must be notified.2 0 Once notified, the NTSB
investigator will go to the scene of the accident, make an immediate
effort to recover the flight and cockpit voice recorders, cordon off the
area, designate the parties who may participate in the investiga-
tion,"' and sequester the recorder. 2
Although the recorders' installation is governed by rigid dura-
bility requirements, 23 the violent impact of the crash may have dam-
aged the tapes and data foil. The recorders cannot be opened until
a member of the investigative staff is present. Normally the recor-
ders are forwarded to the NTSB in Washington because, in handling
the flight recorder "extreme care is essential in removing the record
from an extremely crushed recorder and. . . observation of the styli
position and condition may serve to explain unusual traces on the
recording medium. ' ' 21 Similar caution must be exercised in handling
the cockpit voice recorder. Once opened, the voice recorder's tapes
are run through complex readout devices, and to safeguard against
possible loss, certified copies are made of each recorder track and
18. The flight recorder and cockpit voice recorder are sometimes placed within the same
housing but generally are installed separately in the aircraft. To facilitate locating these
recorders after a crash, the regulations provide that they be painted either bright orange or
bright yellow. 14 C.F.R. § 25.1457(g) (1974) (flight recorder); 14 C.F.R. § 25.1459(d) (1974)
(cockpit voice recorder).
19. 14 C.F.R, § 430.2 (1974).
20. 14 C.F.R. § 430.5 (1974). See Hill, U.S. Air Carrier Accident Investigation
Procedure, 36 J. Am L. & Comm. 414, 415 (1970). The author presents a brief summary of
the various functions to be performed by the NTSB and FAA following an airline crash.
21. 14 C.F.R. § 431.13(b) (1974) provides that these parties shall be responsive to the
appropriate Board representative and can be relieved from participation if they conduct
themselves in a manner prejudicial to the investigation.
22. See Miller and Hanlon, Procedure and Conduct During On-Site Investigations of
Aviation Accidents, 36 J. Am. L. & COMM. 394,400 (1970). The authors largely credit the work
done by the NTSB at the site of a major air disaster, and state that the procedures followed
have proven themselves to the point that other countries copy them at least in principle. See
also Lyall, Aircraft Accident Investigations-the 1969 Regulations, 18 JuIticmL REvmw 228
(1971). The article indicates that the procedures have been followed in England not only as
to the investigation but also as to the public hearings that are subsequently held.
23. 14 C.F.R. § 37.150 (1974).
24. Speiser, Airplane Flight Recorders and Related Devices, in 20 AM. JUR. PROOF oF
FACTS 567, 588 (1968).
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then transcripts prepared of all the recorded information. At this
point, background noise can be isolated, enhanced or eliminated to
reconstruct specific events in the cockpit. 5
After the initial investigation, the Chairman of the Safety
Board will order a hearing whenever he deems it necessary in the
public interest. 6 During the hearing, data gleaned from the flight
recorder and information disclosed by the cockpit voice recorder is
made available to the public.2 7 It should be noted, however, that the
information obtainable at the hearings is factual only. The Board's
final report and conclusions are not made public until a subsequent
time.
LITIGATION PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY § 1441(e)
In civil litigation, the flight recorder and cockpit voice recorder
can serve as invaluable tools. They may be the only evidence avail-
able to determine the cause of the plane crash.26 But the accumula-
tion of data from the flight recorder or the presentation of the recor-
der trace itself would be meaningless to the court and jury without
any explanation .2 Even the recorded conversation of the crew on the
cockpit voice recorder is not self-explanatory, and in the absence of
any explanation, the tapes may not provide the jury with any indi-
cation of how the words spoken relate to the cause of the crash.
Most helpful in clearing up these difficulties would be either
the final report of the NTSB containing its determinations and
conclusions, or the expert testimony of a member or employee of the
Board as to what connections can be made between the conversa-
tions and data before the jury and the probable cause of the crash.
25. See Panel, supra note 2, at 480-81.
26. 14 C.F.R. § 431.21 (1974).
In reaching his decision, the Chairman will consider the degree of public interest
in the particular accident involved, the seriousness of possible deficiencies in the
aircraft or related equipment, the type of operation involved, and the potential bene-
fit in terms of accident prevention.
Puls, Aircraft Accident Hearings, 36 J. Am L. & COMM. 401, 404 (1970).
27. Id. at 404-08. The article presents a complete description of the procedures followed
at these accident hearings. See also Levy, The Role of Federal Investigation in an Aircraft
Case, 18 PRAc. LAW. 65 (1972). The article entails a brief but comprehensive sketch of the
entire investigative process from its initial phase to its final determination of cause.
28. See Note, Evolving Methods of Scientific Proof, 13 N.Y.L.F. 675, 769 (1967).
29. See Speiser, Airline Passenger Death Cases, in 8 AM. Jun. Trials 173 (1965).
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1975], Art. 3
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Such valuable definitive reports and testimony are statutorily
barred, however, by the Federal Aviation Act.30 The restrictions on
the use of the Board's findings are quite apparent from a reading of
the relevant regulations.
The government has administratively construed § 1441(e)
to prohibit use in tort litigation, either at the discovery or
at the trial level, of the Board's expert opinions, conclu-
sions, evaluations and recommendations. Pursuant to that
interpretation, the Board promulgated a regulation which
presently authorizes its employees to testify "only as to
those facts actually observed by them in the course of their
accident investigations and shall respectfully decline to
give opinion evidence as expert witnesses, their evaluations
and conclusions, or testify with respect to recommenda-
tions resulting from accident investigations . ... 3
In addition to limiting the scope of the testimony, the above
regulation makes it difficult to elicit even that limited testimony
from Board employees. Board employees may not testify in any
action unless an "appropriate showing has been made that the facts
desired to be adduced are not reasonably available to the party
seeking such evidence by any other method including the use of
discovery procedures against the opposing party. 32 And such pre-
liminary or factual information will only be made available pro-
vided that furnishing it will not disrupt the course of an accident
investigation or interfere with the employee's duty in investigating
the accident. 3 Litigants are expected to obtain their own expert
witnesses from other sources.3 4 Requests for testimony of a board
employee must be addressed to the general counsel who may ap-
prove or deny the request,35 and if denied the employees will not be
30. 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1970) declares:
No part of any report or reports of the Board relating to any accident or the investiga-
tion thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages
growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports.
31. Good, Use of Long Interrogatories in Aviation Cases, 36 J. Am. L. & COMM. 452,
453 (1970), quoting 14 C.F.R. § 435.4(a) (1970).
32. 14 C.F.R. § 435.4(a) (1974).
33. 14 C.F.R. § 435.3(a) (1974).
34. 14 C.F.R. § 435.4(a) (1974).
35. 14 C.F.R. § 435.4(d) (1974).
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subject to civil subpoena for discovery or for trial." Finally, employ-
ees may testify in actions for damages only by way of deposition or
written interrogatories. 7 It should be noted that these prohibitions
apply only in private litigation, not when the United States is a
party defendant. And because this expert testimony is difficult to
obtain from other than the investigative board personnel, it has
been suggested wherever possible to name the federal government
as a party defendant in an action involving an aircraft accident.8
Despite the explicit provisions of the regulations, the construc-
tion of § 1441(e) has been the subject of much litigation. The courts
have narrowly construed the provision .3 Although the statute bars
the admission of board reports which express agency views as to
probable cause, it does not prevent investigating officials from testi-
fying as to personal observations about the condition of the plane
after the accident. 0 The prevailing opinion is set forth in Berquido
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. ,", where the court interpreted the provision
as follows:
The fundamental policy underlying 1441(e) appears to be
a compromise between the interests of those who would
adopt a policy of absolute privilege in order to secure full
and frank disclosure as to the probable cause . . and the
countervailing policy of making available all accident infor-
mation to litigants in a civil suit. Accordingly, the primary
thrust of the provision is to exclude CAB reports which
express agency views as to the probable cause of the acci-
dent.4"
36. 14 C.F.R. § 435.4(d)(2) (1974).
37. 14 C.F.R. § 435.4(c) (1974). This section formerly provided that they would be
allowed to testify if unusual circumstances were shown.
38. See Speiser, Airplane Flight Recorders and Related Devices, in 20 AM. JUa. PROOF
OF FACTS 567, 596 (1968); Falk v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 113, 115 (D.C. Conn. 1971): "When
the government acts as a litigant, as distinguished from its regulatory functions, its status is
hardly different from that of a private citizen."
39. See, e.g., Israel v. United States, 247 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1957); Ratner v. Arrington,
111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959).
40. Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951).
41. 317 F.2d 628 (3rd Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 925 (1967).
42. Id. at 631-32.
[Vol. 9
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This interpretation was followed in American Airlines, Inc. v.
United States43 where the defendant airline objected to the intro-
duction into evidence of a report by the CAB which contained a
graph plotting the "indicated" altitude and a document explaining
the read-out from the flight recorder of an aircraft which had
crashed. In upholding the admissibility of the report and the docu-
ment, the court stated that the defendant's objection to their intro-
duction was at variance with the prevailing statutory interpretation
as stated in Berguido, since neither the report nor the document
reflected the Board's evaluation of the data in reaching a decision
on probable cause." When the defendant stressed the opinion na-
ture of the testimony, the court further interpreted Berguido as
establishing that opinion testimony going beyond merely personal
observations is admissible provided such testimony does not pre-
sume to be official agency opinion. 5
Thus, Berguido appears to be the controlling authority on inter-
preting the scope of § 1441(e). But in spite of this statutory provi-
sion, these reports and the testimony of CAB employees, no matter
how restricted in scope, are so important in clarifying and explain-
ing data gleaned from the flight recorder that every effort should be
made to obtain as much available information as possible. As one
author commented: "[Vierdicts prove that superficial discovery is
the sure road to defeat in the jury room . . . .Experience proves
that all of the discovery tools frequently should be applied."47
PREVIOUS AVIATION LITIGATION INVOLVING THE USE OF RECORDED
COMMUNICATIONS
The admissibility of the flight recorder or the cockpit voice
recorder has never been considered in a reported case. As indicated
above, much of the post-accident litigation concerned with the ad-
missibility of FAA documents or records has focused on a judicial
43. 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
44. Id. at 196.
45. Id.
46. Cf. Simpson, Use of Aircraft Accident Investigation Information in Actions for
Damages, 17 J. Am. L. & CoMm. 283 (1950). The article supports the Board's position on
disclosure of accident reports and reluctance toward permitting employees to testify. But see
Florsheim, Administrative Law-Aircraft Accident Investigation Records-Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, 33 J. Am. L. & CoMm. 490 (1967).
47. Good, supra note 31, at 453.
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interpretation of §1441(e).4 8 The courts in those cases were asked to
consider the admissibility of documents prepared by government
investigative agencies49 or board employees' testimony, 5 but were
never presented with the question of the admissibility of FAA re-
cordings of any kind. In fact, the only reported decisions where a
court has considered the question of admissibility of a tape record-
ing of radio communications between aircraft and ground installa-
tions in civil aviation litigation is LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World
Airlines.5'
Prior to LeRoy there were several decisions which involved the
use of a recorded conversation between an aircraft and ground in-
stallations, but none discussed the admissibility of the recording
itself. In Schuyler v. United Air Lines,52 the plaintiff sought a new
trial because the court had excluded a photostatic copy of an inves-
tigator's report containing radio communications made immedi-
ately before the crash. The defendant had objected to the admission
of the report on several grounds: best evidence rule; hearsay; not a
business record; and exclusion under §1441(e).13 In denying the mo-
tion for a new trial, the court agreed with the defendant on the issue
of best or secondary evidence, but did not discuss the other conten-
tions.54 The case disclosed that the original recording had been
played twice to the jury although the court made no further mention
as to the admissibility of the original recording.
Sprecht v. CAB55 was an appeal from a decision of the CAB
revoking a pilot's rating for failing to adhere to his traffic control
clearance altitude. The pilot alleged that he left his assigned alti-
tude because he encountered an icing condition which imperiled his
48. Federal Aviation Act § 701(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1970).
49. American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
50. Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3rd Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 925 (1967).
51. 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1966). See Crocker, supra
note 15, at 259-61. This article is an extremely helpful and concise sketch of the major
evidentiary problems that would be raised in FAA recordings cases.
52. 94 F.Supp. 472 (M.D.Pa. 1950).
53. Id. at 475.
54. Id. The court held that since the tape recordings of the last radio message allegedly
received from the airplane prior to the crash were present in court and available, the alleged
report concerning the message was properly excluded as secondary evidence.
55. 254 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1958).
[Vol. 9
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aircraft. The reviewing court relied heavily on a transcript of the
recorded conversation between the pilot and the control tower to
show that no emergency existed which justified a change in alti-
tudeK and sustained the conclusion of the Board.57 The court did
not discuss the admissibility of the recording or the transcript other
than to say it was unquestioned.18
Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co.59 illustrates the type of
problem encountered before such recordings were generally made
available. The pilot of a P-38 who assumed he had been cleared to
land, began his descent and struck a commercial airliner. There was
a substantial conflict in the testimony concerning radio messages
just prior to the accident. The air traffic controller testified that he
cleared the Eastern DC-4 to land, and that the plane was in the
process of making an authorized descent when it was struck by the
P-38. The appellees, however, introduced the testimony of two pil-
ots that the Eastern plane was given no such clearance. 0 The re-
viewing court resolved the conflict in favor of Eastern by holding
that the affirmative testimony that Eastern had been cleared to
land was not controverted by sufficient evidence on the part of the
plaintiffs."
So prior to LeRoy,6 2 the question of the admissibility of flight
recorded communication of any kind had never been decided.
LeRoy was an action for wrongful death brought on behalf of the
children of the decedent who was killed in the crash of defendant's
airplane on the last leg of a flight from Brussels to Rome. The
plaintiff sought to avoid the limitation of the Warsaw Convention 3
56. Id. at 908-14.
57. Id. at 914.
58. Id. at 908.
59. 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
60. Id. at 65-68. The testimony tended to establish that the pilot of the P-38 had in fact
made the unauthorized descent. The Air Traffic Controller told him, "You are No. 2 to land."
Id. at 66. The controller meant that he was to land after the Eastern DC-4. The pilot of the
P-38 did not see the Eastern plane at any time, and when he saw another aircraft, a Lockheed
or Beechcraft taxiing from runway 3 he again radioed the tower. The tower responded "...
prepare to land on Runway 3." Id. at 67. This was not an instruction to begin his descent
immediately. Several seconds after the pilot began his descent he struck the Eastern plane.
61. Id. at 72-73.
62. Leroy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965).
63. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation By Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1936). See Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United
19751
Delory: Flight Recordings as Evidence in Civil Litigation
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975
332 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
by showing that Sabena was guilty of willful misconduct. The plane
should have been flying in a ten-mile-wide corridor which would
have brought it in contact with a signal beacon as it approached the
Rome airport. The plaintiff alleged willful misconduct on the part
of the pilot in that he deliberately mislead the Rome controller as
to his position to avoid a delay which would have been caused if he
had reported an uncertain position.
Over the defendant's objections that it was hearsay, the plain-
tiff introduced a transcript of a radio conversation between the pilot
and the Rome controller. The transcript showed that five minutes
before the crash a Swissair plane had passed over the beacon and
reported that it was operating; three minutes before the crash, the
controller radioed the Sabena pilot and asked if he had passed the
beacon and the pilot confirmed that he had. The controller therefore
authorized a descent which would have been safe if the plane was
in the proper air corridor but proved disastrous with the plane in
the area in which it was. The plane hit the side of a mountain killing
all aboard. In reconstructing the hypothetical position of the plane
when it confirmed that it had passed the beacon, it was shown that
the plane was then thirty miles from the beacon, and that the bea-
con only had a range of twenty-two miles.
The court discussed the admissibility of the recording and held
that the transcript would be admissible if the original recording
would have been, 4 and held that the original recording would have
been admissible as an ordinary business record 5 under the Federal
Business Records Statute." This disposed of the hearsay objection
with respect to the controller's statements. With respect to the
pilot's statement that he had passed the beacon, the court held that
although it was hearsay, it was admissible as an admission of a
party opponent. It was this statement of the pilot that was the
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HAiv. L. REv. 490 (1967). See generally Tompkins,
Limitation of Liability By Treaty and Statute, 36 J. Am L. & COMM. 421, 430 (1970). The
use of recorded data and communications provided by an aircraft's flight and cockpit voice
recorders and those recordings made by ground based installations would be invaluable in
counsel's effort to establish wilful misconduct and thereby go beyond the recovery limitation
provisions.
64. Leroy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 274 (2d Cir. 1965).
65. Id.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970); see also note 120 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1975], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss2/3
1975] FLIGHT RECORDERS 333
evidence of willful misconduct and was submitted to the jury which
did find such misconduct and awarded plaintiff $205,705.00. Judg-
ment was entered on that verdict and affirmed on appeal. 7
Although the court in LeRoy considered only the admissibility
of recordings made by ground-based installations, the court's analy-
sis of the admissibility question would be applicable in civil aviation
litigation where a party seeks to introduce evidence obtained from
either the flight data recorder or the cockpit voice recorder." The
court's opinion, however, is primarily limited to a discussion of the
hearsay issue which is only one of several evidentiary problems at-
tendant the introduction of a sound recording into evidence. Other
issues which must be considered are examined below.
THE EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS
Laying the Proper Foundation for the Admission of the Recordings9
The litigant seeking to introduce a sound recording into evi-
dence must first lay a proper foundation of authenticity of the sound
recording.
The cases are in general agreement as to what constitutes
a proper foundation for the admission of a sound recording
67. Id. at 274. The court also held that the transmissions from the Swissair flight were
hearsay, but their admission did not prejudice Sabena. The Court stated:
Since one of Sabena's principal contentions to the jury was that its plane could have
picked up the. . . beacon. . . , it could only have been to its advantage to establish
that the beacon was operating.
Id.
68. This is especially the case with respect to the cockpit voice recorder. Since the
recordings made by the ground based installations and those made by the cockpit voice
recorder are sound recordings, they pose identical admissibility problems. Consequently, the
focus of the remainder of the article will be primarily on the cockpit voice recorder rather
than the flight data recorder. The data recorder will not, however, be omitted from discussion,
and reference will be made to it in those portions of the paper where the evidentiary problems
raised by the tapes are sufficiently analogous to those that would be raised by the data
recorder to warrant a comparison.
69. The cockpit voice recorder is a tape recording and there are many decisions in non-
aviation cases discussing the admissibility of tape recordings into evidence. Although the
facts of the cases differ substantially from those which would arise in the case of an FAA
recording (since most of those non-aviation cases are criminal), the problems of admissibility
and the requirements necessary for admission are substantially the same. Thus, analogy is
made to those cases to show how similar problems of admissibility may be met and overcome
in situations involving FAA flight recordings. See Crocker, supra note 15.
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and indicate a reasonably strict adherence to the rules pre-
scribed for testing the admissibility of the recordings which
have been outlined as follows: (1) a showing that the record-
ing device was capable of taking testimony; (2) a showing
that the operator of the device was competent; (3) estab-
lishment of the authenticity and correctness of the record-
ing; (4) a showing that changes, additions or deletions are
not present; (5) a showing of the manner of the preservation
of the recordings; (6) identification of the speakers; (7) a
showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made
without any kind of inducement."
There are several cases which have specifically enumerated
these seven elements in determining whether an adequate founda-
tion had been laid.7' Other cases list several of the elements.7" Gen-
erally, a proper foundation may be laid only by substantially meet-
ing all of these requirements. Except for the problem of identifica-
tion of the speakers, these requirements should not pose any real
problem in the case of flight recordings, 3 but each will be given
individual consideration.
The first requirement necessary for laying a proper foundation
for the admission of a tape recording is the capability of the record-
ing device. In view of the extremely rigid regulations established as
to the quality design and installation of both the cockpit voice recor-
der and the flight data recorder,7" it seems unlikely that a party
would be persuasive in questioning the recorders' capability.
The party seeking to introduce the recording must also be able
70. 29 AM. Juta. 2d Evidence § 436 (1967); see also Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1024, 1032-36
(1958).
71. Cf. Steven M. Soloman Jr., Inc. v. Edgar, 92 Ga. App. 207, 211-12, 83 S.E.2d 167,
171 (1955); People v. Frison, 25 Mich. App. 146, 147-48, 181 N.W.2d 75, 76-77 (1970); People
v. Taylor, 18 Mich. App. 381, 383-84, 171 N.W.2d 219, 220 (1969); State v. Miller, 6 Ore. App,
366, 369-70, 487 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1971); State v. Williams, 49 Wash. 2d 354, 360, 301 P.2d
769, 772 (1956) (following Soloman and stating that the court did not feel that the rule
requires an excessive burden of preliminary proof to establish admissibility of the recording).
72. See, e.g., Parnell v. State, 218 So. 2d 535, 541 (Fla. App. 1969) (requiring at least
four of the above seven requirements); State v. Myers, 190 Neb. 146, 149, 206 N.W.2d 851,
854 (1973) (discussing five of the seven listed requirements); Williams v. State, 93 Okla. Crim.
260, 270-71, 226 P.2d 989, 995 (1951).
73. See Crocker, supra note 15, at 261.
74. See notes 6, 12 and 18 supra.
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to show that the operator was competent. Again, this should present
no problem since the recorders operate automatically from the time
the plane commences its takeoff roll until it has completed its land-
ing roll75 (flight recorder), or from before the engines are started to
termination of the final checklist after the flight" (cockpit voice
recorder). And the communication tapes in the control tower are
changed every twelve hours by trained personnel."
In Gomien v. State78 the court held that a proper foundation
was laid when a witness testified that all he was required to do was
turn a switch that started a recording. The actual operation of the
recording was under the control of a thoroughly capable and experi-
enced operator who testified as to how he operated the equipment.
The party seeking to introduce the tape recording is also re-
quired to show that no changes, additions, or deletions have been
made. If the party contesting the admissibility of a tape recording
can show that it has been erased, deleted, or changed in any man-
ner, the court would sustain an objection to its admission.7" But
again, it is unlikely that a party would be persuasive in asserting
that the tapes were deleted or erased in part. In fact, the only
erasure done by the FAA is to eliminate or isolate background noise
in the cockpit.8 0 Similarly, a representative of the FAA to whom the
tapes were entrusted could be deposed to show that no deletions or
alterations were made. In United States v. Fuller,8 the court held
that a foundation for establishing such accuracy was sufficiently
laid when agents through whose hands the tape passed testified that
it had not been altered and its condition at the time of trial was
identical to that at the time of seizure. 82
The party seeking to introduce the tape recording must be pre-
pared to show the manner of preservation of the recording. In Jones
v. State83 the court held that where it conclusively appeared that a
75. See note 8 supra.
76. 14 C.F.R. § 121.359(a) (1974).
77. See Crocker, supra note 15, at 262.
78. 172 So. 2d 511, 515 (Fla. App. 1965).
79: Williams v. State, 226 P.2d 989, 995. (1951). Accord, Cummings v. Jess Edwards,
Inc., 445 S.W.2d 767, 773 (Tex. App. 1969).
80. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
81. 441 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971).
82. Id. at 762.
83. 253 So. 2d 154 (Fla. App. 1971).
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recorded disc of the defendant's statement had remained in posses-
sion of the local detective bureau from the time it was made until
the time it was offered into evidence and that it was in the same
condition when it was offered in evidence as when originally taken
to the bureau, there was sufficient compliance with the rule govern-
ing the continuity of possession." It is not difficult to show the
manner of preservation for FAA flight recordings, since the recorder
is usually sent from the scene of the crash directly to Washington
and remains there while transcripts and rerecordings are made.,5
The requirement that the testimony be voluntarily given is
applicable primarily in criminal cases88 to protect against entrap-
ment. It could not seriously be contested that what was recorded on
FAA tapes was involuntarily given.
Establishing the authenticity of an FAA recording by identifi-
cation of the speakers presents the only difficulty in laying a proper
foundation for admission of the recording." But on the other hand
it is not an insurmountable task.
Modern technology makes commonplace the receipt of oral
communications from persons who are heard but not seen.
The problems of authentication raised by these communi-
cations are substantially analogous to the problems of au-
thenticating writings."
Three methods may be used in authenticating writings:" (1) have
84. Id. at 157; see also State v. Alleman, 218 La. 822, 829, 51 So. 2d 83, 85 (1950). The
defendant contended that the state did not disclose the method it used to preserve a wire
recording. The court disagreed, stating that where the state had shown that after the record-
ing was made it was in the care and custody of one of the officers and locked in the sheriff's
office and that prior to trial the state had established that it was an exact reproduction,
proper preservation was sufficiently shown.
85. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., State v. Hendricks, 456 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1970); Commonwealth v. Jackson,
450 Pa. 575, 301 A.2d 632 (1973).
87. These two requirements are combined because they are necessarily analogous. Iden-
tification of the speakers in a recorded conversation establishes authenticity.
If direct testimony of the authorship of a writing or of an oral statement is given, this
is sufficient authentication and the judge has no problem on that score.
C. MCCORMICK, EvmENCE, § 227, at 555 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]. See
also 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 738 (1964).
88. MCCORMICK, supra note 87 at § 226.
89. Tracey, The Introduction of Documentary Evidence, 24 IowA L. REv. 436, 441-45
(1969).
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the witness testify that he was present and saw the party sign; 0 (2)
if the witness did not see the party sign but is familiar with his
signature, have the witness identify the signature as the genuine
signature of the person purporting to sign;' (3) if the witness is
neither present nor sufficiently familiar with the party's signature
to testify to the genuineness of the specimen but does have in his
possession another document signed by such party, have the witness
produce that document for comparison with the specimen.92
Where the witness actually hears the original conversation
which is being recorded and identifies the voice on the tape as that
of the participant in the conversation, the tape is authenticated.
This authentication by direct proof is analogous to the situation
where a witness personally observes a party sign the writing. 3 In
Todisco v. United States,94 a prosecution for attempting to bribe an
I.R.S. agent, the court held that a tape recording of a conversation
with the defendant was properly authenticated where the agent,
who had participated in the conversation with the defendant, testi-
fied as to the accuracy of the tapes and identified the voices that
could be heard. One court also held that voices on a tape were
properly identified where a witness testified that he had seen the
conversation taking place with two police officers and the defen-
dant, and the witness had placed the recorder on one of the police
officers." Since the court had already heard the officers testify, the
court deduced that the third voice had to be that of the defendant.
It was suggested by one court that the most logical way to lay
a foundation for the playing of the recordings was for the participant
90. See, e.g., Durham v. State, 422 P.2d 691 (Wyo. 1967).
91. See McCosmicK, supra note 87, at § 221. Tracey, supra note 89 at 443:
The witness . . . must, of course, be qualified . . . not . . . [as] a handwriting
expert, but only that he be shown to be a person acquainted with the handwriting of
the person whose signature he identifies and that from such acquaintance he is
satisfied that the signature is genuine.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Cashio, 420 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1970). See also
McCoRMICK, supra note 87, at § ,221.
93. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
94. 298 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962). Accord, Chavira
Gonzales v. United States, 314 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1963); Brandow v. United States, 268 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1959); Webb v. State, 486 S.W.2d 684 (Ark. 1972); People v. Dupree, 156 Cal.
App. 2d 60, 319 P.2d 39 (1st Div. 1957).
95. Lindsay v. State, 41 Ala. 85, 125 So. 2d 716 (Ala. App. 1960), cert. stricken, 125
So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1960).
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in the conversations to listen to the recordings and to state whether,
according to his recollections, the conversations were truthfully re-
corded.9" And, finally, one court has held that where a participant
in the taping of a conversation testifies, his testimony meets the first
five of the seven requirements. 7
Under the above analysis, an air traffic controller or a surviving
crew member could authenticate FAA recordings by direct proof. A
controller who was a participant in the original communication be-
tween the aircraft and a ground based installation could authenti-
cate the tape by identifying the voices that are heard on the tape.9
A surviving crew member who was in the presence of the pilot and
hears the original communication can similarly authenticate the
tape by identifying the voice on the recording as that of the pilot. 9
But the testimony of a witness who was a participant in the original
conversation or a witness who was in the immediate presence of the
speaker is not essential to authenticating a tape.'00 In the absence
of such direct proof there are still three methods of identifying the
speaker's voice on the recording by means of circumstantial proof. 10'
The first method is to have a witness familiar with the voice of
the speaker identify that the voice heard on the tape is that of the
speaker. This authentication by a person not in the presence of the
speaker is analogous to the situation in which a witness familiar
with the handwriting of a particular party identifies the signature
of that party although he did not see the party sign.102 In trying to
establish the identity of the speaker, a relative or friend who is
familiar with the voice could be called to identify it.'"3
96. People v. Finch, 216 Cal. App. 2d 444, 453, 30 Cal. Rptr. 901, 907 (1963).
97. State v. Miller, 6 Ore. App. 366, 370-71, 487 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1971).
98. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
99. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
100. Anderson, Tape Recordings as Evidence, in 17 Am. JuR. 2d PROOF OF FAcrs 1, 44
(1966):
It is advisable but not absolutely necessary for witnesses to have seen the speaker at
the time the recording was made in order to identify the speaker.
101. Winburn v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co., 261 S.C. 568, 576-77, 201 S.E.
2d 372, 376 (1973):
The proof of authenticity required preliminary to the introduction of an instrument
in evidence need not be direct proof. Authenticity of documentary evidence may be
shown, so as to render it admissible in evidence, by direct or circumstantial evidence.
102. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
103. McGuire v. State, 200 Md. 601, 92 A.2d 582 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 928
(1953).
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In People v. Nahas,'1" two police officers testified that they
knew the defendant and heard his voice before the date in question
and testified that the voice on the recording was that of the defen-
dant. The court held that was sufficient identification of the defen-
dant's voice to be authenticated. Similarly, in LeRoy, there was a
tentative identification by another captain who testified that he was
"practically sure that he recognized the voice of the particular crew
member."'' 5 The court stated that this identification taken in the
context of the transmission "makes it highly unlikely to say the
least, that a transmission purportedly coming from the Sabena
plane did not in fact do so. We think that the source of the transmis-
sion was sufficiently identified."'10"
It should be noted that the identity of the party need not be
known at the time of the conversation-it is sufficient if the knowl-
edge which enabled the witness to identify the other party was
obtained later.'07
A second method of circumstantial proof, analogous to that
used to identify participants in telephone calls, also may be used to
authenticate a recording. Thus, where the pilot directly identifies
himself or his flight and the circumstances would tend to confirm
his identity (i.e., flight, path, position, etc.) the source would be
sufficiently identified and the recording identified.0 8
Direct proof is not required, 109 but a mere statement of identity
by the party calling or called is not in itself sufficient proof of such
identity; unless, in addition to his statement of identity, he relates
facts and circumstances which would tend to reveal that identity."0
104. 9 Ill. App. 3d 570, 578, 292 N.E.2d 466, 472 (1973).
105. LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 274 (2d Cir. 1965).
106. Id.
107. State v. Porter, 251 S.C. 393, 398, 168 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1968). State v. Massey,
266 S.W.2d 880, 883 (Tex. App. 1954) (even one year later). The court stated:
We know of no reason why the time of the personal meeting should enter into the
question of admissibility, though it might well effect its weight.
108. Crocker, supra note 15, at 262.
109. United States v. Young, 470 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
967 (1973). The circumstantial evidence connecting the defendant with telephone calls was
adequate foundation for admission of the telephone records against him. Direct proof is not
required. Accord, United States v. Estrada, 441 F.2d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1971), Carbo v. United
States, 314 F.2d 718, 743 (9th Cir. 1963).
110. 29 AM. JTuR. 2d Evidence § 383 (1967).
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Thus, with the emphasis placed upon circumstances,
[t]he FAA tape recordings provide an even more reliable
check on identification since it can be shown by indepen-
dent evidence that the aircraft was in the transmitting
area, that when the place was called by its identification
number the person answering identified himself as speak-
ing from the plane and the nature of the call and surround-
ing facts and circumstances usually will tend to confirm
that identity.''
One final method of identifying the speaker's voice is to com-
pare it with other voice tapes of the pilot which might exist or by a
scientific comparison of the "voice prints" or sound spectrograms of
the existing tapes with the voice on the accident recording.", This
last method of authentication is analogous to authenticating a writ-
ing by comparing the handwriting of a questioned document with
that of an exemplar."13
Admissibility as a Business Record Under 28 U.S.C. § 1732
The tapes from the cockpit voice recorder and those recordings
made by FAA ground based installations may or may not contain
hearsay depending on the nature of the transmissions and the pur-
pose for which they are offered. "4 Even if the recording does contain
hearsay it would be admissible as a record made in the regular
course of business under 28 U.S.C. § 1732."11 In LeRoy the court held
111. Crocker, supra note 15, at 262.
112. Id. For a discussion of the admissibility of spectrography evidence, see Annot., 49
A.L.R.3d 915 (1973); Comment, Evidence: Admissibility of Spectrographic Voice
Identification, 56 MINN. L. Rv. 1235 (1972).
113. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
114. Crocker, supra note 15, at 262. The author gives two examples to point out the
difference. If the recording is offered to show that the control tower warned the deceased pilot
of another aircraft in the traffic pattern or instructed the pilot that he was cleared to land on
a particular runway the hearsay rule does not apply since the recording was not offered to
prove that there was in fact another plane in the traffic pattern or in fact that the runway
was clear. On the other hand, if the recording contains a message from the deceased pilot
that one of the engines was on fire and offered as evidence of the fact that the engine was on
fire then it is clearly hearsay.
115. In any court of the United States and in any court established by act of
Congress, any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or other-
wise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event
shall be admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if made
in the regular course of any business and if it was the regular course of business to
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that although the statements by the Rome controller were hearsay
they were nevertheless admissible under the Federal Business Re-
cords Statute holding:
The archetype of the records to which § 1732 was intended
to apply is the typical business accounting records, a rou-
tine factual entry made without reference to anticipated
litigation . . . . The statute's rationale is equally applica-
ble to the recording here involved, which was a simultane-
ous recording made as part of a regular air control proce-
dure . . . . [T]he recording, thus, was at least the equiva-
lent of a regular written journal kept by the Rome controller
and was a contemporaneous business record. That is all
§1732 purports to require.1 '
To establish a recording as a business record, certain conditions
must be shown to exist. McCormick lists four conditions in the
common law which had to be shown if the business entry was to be
admissible to prove the facts recited in it:
make such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction occurrence
or event or within reasonable time thereafter.
All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack
of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to effect its weight
but not its admissibility.
The term "business" as used in this section, includes business, profession, occu-
pation and calling of every kind.
MCCORMICK, supra note 87 at § 306. This statute is codification of the Commonwealth Fund
Act, and in addition to the federal jurisdiction it has widespread adoption in most jurisdic-
tions and even in those states in which there is no statute comparable to any of these model
formulations. However, it is likely that the development of the common law exception will
follow closely interpretations of the model formulations. See also Laughlin, Business Entries
and the Like, 46 IOWA L. REv. 276, 277 (1961) (listing those states which have adopted some
form of business entry statute and those which have not).
The Federal Rules of Evidence also contain a provision similar to § 1732:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Activity-A memorandum, report, record or
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, all in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or any other qualified witness, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EvrD. § 803(6).
116. LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1965).
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(a) entries must be original entries made in the routine
course of business;
(b) entries must have been made upon the personal
knowledge of the recorder or someone reporting to him;
(c) the entries must have been shown to have been made
at or near the time of the transaction recorded;
(d) the recorder and his informant must be shown to be
unavailable. ' 7
Today the unavailability of the informant is no longer required.
The federal statute does not even mention it as a requirement18 and
the Federal Rules provide that such unavailability is immaterial."9
In any event, the common law requirements incorporated by the
statutes present no serious obstacle to establishing that the record-
ings made by the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder
are admissible as regularly kept records.
The first requirement is that the recordings be made in the
routine of a business. 1 0 The term business is to be construed liber-
ally and not "mechanistically applied,' 2' but it should be noted
that even though the formal requirements for admissibility of such
records may be shown, they are not to be admitted automatically;
the indispensable fundamental trustworthiness of the proferred re-
cord must be evident.' 22 In LeRoy, the court moved away from the
strict interpretation of "business" stating that the archetype of
these records was the factual accounting type record and that the
rationale of the statute would be equally applicable to this type of
recording.'1 The advisory committee's notes to the Federal Rules
would lend support to this departure from both the limited view of
business entries,'2 ' and the strict construction of the term "busi-
117. McCoRMICK, supra note 87, at § 306.
118. See note 115 supra.
119. Fan. R. Evm. § 803(6) (1975).
120. See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 518, 158 S.E.2d 663, 668 (1968);
State v. Addington, 205 Kan. 640, 652, 472 P.2d 225, 234 (1972). See also MCCORMICK, supra
note 87, at § 308; 30 AM. Jua. 2d Evidence § 937 (1967); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 685 (1964).
121. Coulter v. State, 494 S.W.2d 876, 883 (Tex. App. 1973).
122. See Bowman v. Kaufman, 387 F.2d 582, 587 (2d.Cir. 1967); Woolner Theaters Inc.
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 333 F. Supp. 658, 659 (E.D. La. 1970) (both cases citing LeRoy).
123. LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1965).
124. 56 F.R.D. 183, 311 (1972). The rule acknowledges advanced technology:
The form which the "record" may assume under this rule is described broadly as a
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ness" itself.ss
The second requirement is that the entries be made at or near
the time of the transaction.' 2
Whether an entry made subsequent to the transaction has
been made within a sufficient time to render it within the
exception depends upon whether the time span between the
transaction and the entry was so great as to suggest a dan-
ger of inaccuracy by lapse of memory.' 7
This requirement should present no problem in regard to the
flight recorders since the recording takes place simultaneously with
the occurrence. In LeRoy, the court described the recordings as
being "simultaneous" and "contemporaneous" business records.' 28
The final requirement is that the entries be made upon the
personal knowledge of the reporter or someone reporting to him.'2
Again, this requirement presents no difficulty. Since the person
reporting or making the entries would be the pilot or the flight
controller, personal knowledge of the matter entered is obvious.
Considering for a moment the recordings made by an FAA
ground based installation, it should be noted that the party at-
tempting to introduce a recording of a conversation between the
"memorandum, report, record or data compilation, in any form." The expression
"data compilation" is used as broadly descriptive of any means of storing information
other than the conventional words and figures in written or documentary form.
Id.
125. Id. at 308:
To get away from the stringent idea of records being squeezed into the fact patterns
which give rise to the traditional business records. The rule therefore adopts the
phrase "the course of a regularly conducted activity" as capturing the essential basis
of the hearsay exception as it has evolved and the essential element which can be
abstracted from the various specifications of what is a "business."
126. See, e.g., Thompson v. AAA Lumber Company, 245 Ark. 518, 522, 432 S.W.2d 873,
875 (1968). See also McCoas~ucK, supra note 87, at § 309; 30 AM. Jut. 2d Evidence § 938
(1967); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 690 (1964).
127. See Martin v. Glenn's Furniture Co., Inc., 126 Ga. App. 692, 191 S.E.2d 567, 570.
The fact that information was not placed on a business ledger until 28 days later did not
render it inadmissible; Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 223 (9th Cir. 1957)
(even a lapse of several months did not render a business ledger inadmissible).
128. LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 274 (2d Cir. 1965).
129. See McCoRMICK, supra note 87, at § 310; 30 AM. Jun. 2d Evidence § 938 (1967);
32 C.J.S. Evidence § 690 (1964).
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pilot of an aircraft and an air traffic controller will often be faced
with a problem of hearsay. Although the LeRoy court held that the
statements of the controller on the recording were admissible under
an exception to the hearsay rule for business records,'30 there still
remained the hearsay objection with respect to the pilot's state-
ments. Based on LeRoy, the controller's statements will conform
with an exception to the hearsay rule, since the recording is "at least
as satisfactory as a written record kept by the controller."' 3 ' But the
pilot's statements remain inadmissible as hearsay unless they con-
form with some exception to the rule. A statement by the pilot
amounting to an admission would be one such exception.
Admissions are defined as "the words or acts of a party-
opponent, or of his predecessor or representative, offered as evidence
against him."' 32 In LeRoy, the pilot of the Sabena airplane radioed
the tower that he had passed the beacon when, in fact, the plane
was more than eight miles beyond its range. The court held that
although the pilot's statement was hearsay, it fell within the excep-
tion to the hearsay rule for admissions of a party-opponent. The
opinion, however, pointed out that the courts have been reluctant
to admit business records where the information was obtained only
through hearsay, but allowed the recordings stating:
But the statements involved in this case are not the gratui-
tous reports of persons not involved in the business. If the
plane crews were not required to make such reports, it cer-
tainly was at least the regular business practice for them to
do so.'33
An excited utterance is another exception to the hearsay rule
with which the pilot's statement would conform. The theory of this
exception is simply that "circumstances may produce a condition
of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and
produces utterances free of conscious fabrication," '' thus, insuring
130. LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 878 (1966).
131. Id. at 274.
132. MCCORMICK, supra note 87, at § 262. See also Pekelis v. Transcontinental & West-
ern Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951); Paulsen
v. Scott, 260 Wis. 141, 50 N.W.2d 376 (1951).
133. LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d at 273.
134. 56 F.R.D. 183, 304 (1973).
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trustworthiness. The question of how long the excited condition can
prevail is by no means settled,3 5 but it would seem that in this
context
. . . even an extended series of radio conversations [or
statements made by the pilot or crew] would be covered by
the res gestae rationale where it appears from surrounding
circumstances that . . . [they were] under some emo-
tional stress throughout. 3 '
In addition to affecting the admissibility of tape recorded com-
munications between aircraft and ground based installations, the
hearsay problem could also affect the admissibility of tape record-
ings of crew conversations made by the cockpit voice recorder. For
example, if crew members are conversing or commenting upon
something, the remarks of each crew member may or may not con-
tain hearsay. Again, this would depend upon the nature of the re-
marks and the purpose for which they are sought to be introduced.
If the statements of more than one crew member contain hearsay,
then again, in order to introduce those tapes into evidence each of
the statements contained therein must conform with some excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.
Overcoming the hearsay objection is only one problem facing
the party seeking to introduce these tapes into evidence. When the
original cannot be obtained, and a rerecording or transcript of the
original must be used, "best evidence" objections are likely to arise.
Transcripts and Rerecordings of The Tapes and Problems of the
Best Evidence
It was pointed out above that when a major airline crash occurs
the flight recorder and the cockpit voice recorder are sent to Wash-
ington. There they are subjected to highly sophisticated readout
135. Id.
136. Crocker, supra note 15, at 263. Crocker, however, uses the example of spontaneous
utterances to show that the airline might escape liability by showing that some malfunction
in the aircraft is evidenced by the pilot's statement. But it seems likely that an opposing party
could also use the pilot's statement to his advantage. For example, suppose the last transmis-
sion the pilot makes or the last statement recorded on the cockpit voice recorder is "I've come
in too low, I've got to correct," and then could not correct in time to avert the crash. An
opposing party could use this statement as proof of pilot error in an action against the airline.
Therefore the spontaneous utterance can be a two-edged sword.
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techniques which ultimately result in transcripts containing the in-
formation gleaned from the flight data recorder, and both tran-
scripts and rerecordings of the cockpit voice recorder's tapes. The
offer of such a transcript or rerecording will most likely be met by
an objection that it is not the best evidence and should not be
admitted.
Although the best evidence rule has come to be associated pri-
marily with contesting a writing, the problems which arise when
introducing transcripts and rerecordings are analogous to those en-
countered in introducing a writing.'37 The basic rationale of the rule
is that if it is shown that there is a higher grade of evidence existing
which, if produced, would more satisfactorily explain and establish
a fact that the evidence offered, then the evidence actually pro-
duced will be excluded on the grounds that it is secondary evi-
dence. ,38
Whatever rationale is viewed to support the rule, it will be
observed that the advent of modem discovery and related
procedures under which original documents may be exam-
ined before trial rather that at it, have substantially re-
duced the need for the rule. 39
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that "areas remain in which
the best evidence rule continues to operate usefully . . . and that a
sensibly administered best evidence rule still has a place in a mod-
ern system of evidence.""'
137. Note, 64 HRv. L. REv. 1369 (1951).
Although a recording is not colloquially considered to be a writing, it. . .should be
similarly treated in relation to the best evidence rule since the policy of the rule-to
obtain the most truly probative evidence of a preserved communication-is equally
applicable to recordings.
The article also contends that rerecordings should be admitted as duplicate originals which
under the best evidence rule would be admissible to prove the contents of a writing without
requiring an excuse for not producing the original.
138. See, e.g., General Builders Supply Co. v. MacArthur, 228 Md. 320, 327, 179 A.2d
868, 872 (1962); In Re Riggs' Estate, 68 Misc. 2d 760, 761, 328 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (1972). See
also 29 AM. JuR. 2d Evidence § 448 (1967); 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 780 (1964).
139. McComwcK, supra note 87, at § 231. E.g., in State v. Melerine, 236 La. 881, 109
So. 2d 454 (1959) where the parties, prior to trial, indicated that they would be satisfied with
the use of transcriptions, of tape recordings, the court held that in furtherance of the stipula-
tion the transcriptions were admissible.
140. Cleary and Strong, The Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation in Context, 51 IowA
L. REv. 825, 847-48 (1966).
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There are numerous cases where objection has been made to the
introduction into evidence of typewritten transcripts as a violation
of the best evidence rule."'
[B]ut generally typewritten [transcripts] of sound re-
cordings have been held admissible in evidence if their ac-
curacy and reliability is clearly established and especially
if the original is produced for comparison."'
But with respect to the flight recorder and cockpit voice recor-
der, production of the original may be impossible because it could
not be located after the crash. Additionally, the recording may have
been so badly damaged in the crash that the transcripts and re-
recordings made after subjecting the original to sophisticated
readout devices is the only way in which the information would be
intelligible. In such cases the original should be excused and other
evidence of its contents become admissible."'
Even in cases where the original recording is available it still
may be desirable to use transcripts contemporaneously with the
playing of the recording to assist the jury in understanding the
original."' In fact, several courts have stated that it is desirable for
the jury to have a transcript before them so that they may follow
the original as it is being played." 5
In any event, a transcript which is sought to be admitted must
141. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 598 (1974).
142. Anderson, Tape Recordings as Evidence, in 17 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 1, 43
(1966).
143. United States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437, 442 (2d Cir. 1967). See also MCCORMICK,
supra note 87, at § 237.
144. Crocker, supra note 15, at 263.
Due to factors of excessive background noise which cannot be eliminated [or static
on the tapes] an FAA tape recording may be difficult for a jury to grasp fully even
if played over several times. Thus, it will usually be helpful to provide a typewritten
transcript of the recording to assist the jury in understanding the original.
See also Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1024, 1042 (1958).
145. See People v. Finch, 216 Cal. App. 2d 444, 452, 30 Cal. Rptr. 901, 907 (1963):
The important thing is that the jurors to hold a transcript as they listened to theplay
back of the records was no different than allowing them to have, in an appropriate
case, a photograph, a drawing, a map or model .. as an assistance to understand-
ing.
Accord United States v. Hall, 342 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1965).
19751
Delory: Flight Recordings as Evidence in Civil Litigation
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975
348 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
be shown to be accurate. In Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick,'" the court
held:
When the safeguards as to accuracy are fully met, and the
discs themselves are laid in evidence to afford the adverse
party the opportunity to determine the correctness of the
transcript no good reason appears for excluding such evi-
dence. "
In LeRoy, the court stated that if the appendix to the accident
report (based on the recording) was admissible, then the transcript
would be admissible since the transcript did not contain any infor-
mation which was not contained in the report itself.148
One way of proving the authenticity of the transcript to the
satisfaction of the court is to have the person who prepared the
transcription appear and testify to its accuracy. 149 The presence of
the transcriber is an important factor in establishing the transcript's
authenticity. Some courts have held that where the person who
identified the transcripts was neither the transcriber not present
when they were transcribed, the transcripts were inadmissible. 50 In
view of the emphasis which many courts place upon the testimony
of the actual transcriber, the surest method of guaranteeing admis-
sion of a transcript is to depose the FAA employee who made the
transcript and have him attest to its accuracy.
It may also be necessary to resort to rerecordings of the original
tape in court. As with the use of transcripts:
[Rerecordings] are generally held admissible over the
objection that they are not the best evidence, provided their
authenticity is established and the original is made avail-
able for purpose of comparison. 5 '
146. 123 Conn. 218, 193 A.2d 765 (1937).
147. Id. at 225. Accord, People v. Wojahn, 169 Cal. App. 2d 135, 337 P.2d 192 (1959).
See also Grimes v. Wainwright, 346 F.Supp. 713 (D.C. Fla. 1972). The court denied peti-
tioner's writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner alleged inaccuracies in a transcript of his
tape recorded statements, which he did not raise in the trial court.
148. LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 272 (2d Cir. 1965).
149. Commonwealth v. Hart, 403 Pa. 652, 170 A.2d 850 (1961).
150. See, e.g., Bonicelli v. State, 339 P.2d 1063 (Okla. 1959); Duggan v. State, 189 So.
2d 890 (Fla. App. 1966).
151. 29 AM. JuR. 2d Evidence § 436 (1967). Annot., 58 A.L.R. 2d 1024, 1044 (1958).
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Just as a transcript may be used in situations where the original
recording has either been lost or so badly damaged as to render it
unintelligible, similarly a rerecording may be used in such situa-
tions.12 The courts have also commented on the value of the re-
recording in assisting the jury to follow and understand more clearly
what is said on the original.' 3
The basic rationale of the rule relating to rerecordings was dis-
cussed in State v. Lyskoski' 54 where the rerecording was likened to
a photograph. In holding the rerecording admissible the court
stated:
The audible tape recording [rerecording] bears the same
relationship to the inaudible wire recording [original] that
a photograph bears to the negative. No good purpose would
be served by not following the rule applicable to both.' 55
The person who made the rerecordings plays an equally impor-
tant role in establishing the authenticity of the rerecording as the
person who transcribed the original onto the challenged transcript.
In United States v. Madda,5 the engineer who made the rerecord-
ings testified that the conversations were completely rerecorded,
that the material was the same, and that he did not dub any sound.
And when the voices on the rerecording were properly identified, the
court held that the rerecordings were properly authenticated and
that they were admissible. Thus, the party seeking to admit the re-
recording would be well advised to depose'57 the board employee who
made the rerecording. There should not be a great deal of difficulty
admitting the rerecording since:
Where counsel are afforded an opportunity to check the
original on the equipment available at any FAA communi-
cations center, there would seem to be no reason for refus-
152. See note 143 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Knohl, 379
F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1967) (rerecording admitted where witness testified that she had lost the
original).
153. Fountain v. United States, 384 F.2d 625, 631 (5th Cir. 1967).
154. 42 Wash. 2d 102, 287 P.2d 119 (1964).
155. Id. at 105. Accord, Hurt v. State, 303 P.2d 476, 485 (Okla. 1956).
156. 345 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1965). Accord, People v. Albert, 182 Cal. App. 2d 729, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 473 (1960).
157. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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ing to accept the recording simply because it was not the
best evidence.' 51
Two additional points should be noted in regard to the best
evidence problem raised by transcript and rerecordings. If a witness
has overheard a conversation or communication, his testimony as to
that communication is primary evidence even though it may be
later documented or incorporated in a sound recording. Under such
circumstances, secondary evidence is not sought to prove the con-
tents of a writing or recording, but rather all the evidence is primary
evidence stemming from a common cause.'59 This situation is partic-
ularly applicable where an FAA controller, who heard a communica-
tion at one of the ground based centers, may be called upon to
testify to help clear up an uncertain part of a recording.
Secondly, it is permissible for a witness to give a summary
based on a number of documents when the documents are so numer-
ous and intricate as to make an examination of them in court im-
practicable. The admission of proof of this character is not a viola-
tion of the best evidence rule, but a realization thereof demanded
by the exigencies of the case.'60 This situation is more applicable
when considering the flight data recorder where it may be helpful
to have a summary prepared explaining the various data contained
in it.
In any event, in light of the high degree of skill with which
rerecordings and transcripts are made, it is almost certain that they
will attain a high degree of accuracy and the best evidence rule
should not be made to unduly hinder their admission by relegating
them to the status of secondary evidence. For as one court has
stated:
An over-technical and strained application of the best evi-
dence rule serves only to hamper the inquiry without ad-
vancing the cause of truth.''
158. Crocker, supra note 15, at 264.
159. People v. Kulwin, 102 Cal. App. 2d 104, 226 P.2d 672 (1951). See also 29 AM. Ju.
2d Evidence § 449 (1967).
160. 29 AM. Jun. 2d Evidence § 458 (1967). Such a sufamary must confine itself to the
fact or date and must exclude opinion. But if it were possible to get a Board member to testify
in a given situation, the Board member's testimony would already be bound by this limitation
under § 1441(e).
161. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 845 (2d Cir. 1939).
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1975], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss2/3
FLIGHT RECORDERS
Transcripts and rerecordings constitute a valuable source of
evidence and, when properly authenticated, can be introduced into
evidence. But suppose a party wants to introduce the original re-
cording into evidence. If for some reason the original was held inad-
missible, an attempt to introduce the transcripts or rerecordings
would be to no avail. 6 2
Partial Inaudibility and Its Effect on Admissibility
Although the flight recorder and cockpit data recorder are de-
signed to withstand the most catastrophic conditions, sometimes
the tremendous impact of a crash may damage or destroy some of
the recording. Sometimes, because of background noise in the cock-
pit or the failure of the pilot to speak distinctly, the tape from the
cockpit recorder may be inaudible or garbled in part. These facts
do not always mean the tape will automatically be excluded, pro-
vided the inaudibility is not substantial:
The fact that a recording may not reproduce an entire con-
versation or may be indistinct or inaudible in part, has
usually been held not to require its exclusion; however, the
recording may be rejected if it is so inaudible and indistinct
that the jury must speculate as to what was said. . . . Un-
less the unintelligible portions of the tape recording are
so substantial as to render the recording as a whole
untrustworthy, the recording is admissible, and the deci-
sion whether or not to admit it should be left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge.'6
Each of the aspects in the above general principle will be briefly
examined.
It is not a prerequisite of trustworthiness that 100% of a conver-
sation be recorded."' Similarly, if statements or conversations con-
tained on the tape are indistinct or inaudible in part this will not
162. 32A C.J.S. § 783 (1964):
Secondary evidence of the contents of a writing cannot be introduced where it ap-
pears that, for any reason, the writing if produced would not be admissible.
163. 29 AM. JUm. 2d Evidence § 436 (1967).
164. Christiensen v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 52 Haw. 80, 470 P.2d 521 (1973).
A tape recording was held admissible when only ten minutes of a one and one-half hour
conversation was recorded.
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require exclusion of the recordings. The frequently cited rationale
for the admission of inaudible tapes was laid down in United States
v. Schanerman:"'1
[T]he mere fact that certain portions of the mechanically 5
recorded conversations were less audible than others did
not call for exclusion of what the jurors personally heard
from the playing of the records. There would be no more
valid reason for exclusion of the mechanically recorded con-
versations than there would be for excluding competent
conversations, overheard in fact, by human witness."6
The courts have exercised great liberality as to admission of
recordings which are partially inaudible. Tapes have been admitted
where intelligible only in part,"7 or when only half the tape is intelli-
gible, ' 8 or where in the opinion of the court, although largely unin-
telligible, the tapes have any probative value at all. 69
Additionally, for a recording to be admissible it must not be so
inaudible or unintelligible that jurors must speculate as to what is
being said. In State v. Carter,'7 where a tape recording was rendered
unintelligible by background noise which could not be filtered out,
the court held the recording to be inadmissible, stating:
Individual jurors might have speculated upon the various
isolated portions of the recording which could be under-
stood. Such speculation cannot be a basis for conviction. 7'
Jury speculation could present a problem for a party trying to admit
FAA tapes where background cockpit noise cannot be eliminated
even with the use of sophisticated machinery the FAA possesses.
Although tapes which are partly unintelligible or inaudible are
not usually excluded, if the unintelligible portion of the tape is of
165. 150 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1945).
166. Id. at 944. Accord, People v. Porter, 105 Cal. App. 2d 324, 233 P.2d 102 (1951).
167. United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932, 937 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
949 (1969).
168. Addison v. United States, 317 F.2d 808, 816 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
905 (1964).
169. Byrne v. United States, 327 F.2d 825, 826 (9th Cir. 1964).
170. 254 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1971).
171. Id. at 231. Accord, People v. Sacchetella, 31 App. Div. 2d 180, 183, 295 N.Y.S.2d
880, 882 (1968).
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prime importance to the tape as a whole it will be held inadmissible.
The principal case in this area is Monroe v. United States,"' where
the defendant, in a prosecution for attempting to bribe a police
officer, objected to the admission of a tape which was inaudible in
part. The court held:
No all-embracing rule on admissibility should flow from
partial inaudibility or incompleteness . . . .Unless the
unintelligible portions are so substantial as to render the
whole untrustworthy the recording is admissible .... 13
Finally, however unintelligible the tape is, or for whatever du-
ration the unintelligible portion lasts, the decision whether or not
to admit is within the sole discretion of the judge.' In State v.
Driver,' ' the court laid down guidelines by which a judge should
exercise his discretion:
Before allowing a sound recording to be used, the trial judge
should listen to it out of the presence of the jury so that he
can decide whether it is sufficiently audible, intelligible,
not obviously fragmented, and also whether it contains any
improper or prejudicial mattqr which ought to be deleted.' 6
In view of the overall liberality which the courts display in
admitting sound recordings generally, it would appear that, unless
the flight recording was substantially damaged in the crash, or an
essential part so impaired as to render the whole untrustworthy, the
recording would be admitted into evidence.
CONCLUSION
In light of the highly technical procedures involved in the de-
sign and installation of the flight recorder and cockpit voice recorder
172. 234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956). Accord, United
States v. Kabot, 295 F.2d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 1961); Cape v. United States, 283 F.2d 430 (9th
Cir. 1960). In Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829
(1963), the court held:
While it appears that parts of [the tapes] are inaudible we cannot say that .. the
inaudible parts are substantial so as to make the rest more leading than helpful.
173. Id. at 54-55.
174. People v. Spencer, 60 Cal. 2d 64, 313 P.2d 134, 31 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 1007 (1964).
175. 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962).
176. Id. at 288, 183 A.2d at 672.
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which render the possibilities of inaccuracies slight, their trustwor-
thiness as valuable pieces of evidence should be obvious. With the
ever increasing amount of air travel, the possibility of accidents is
not remote. The flight recordings may offer the only clues to a deter-
mination of what caused the accident. And the role which they can
play in litigation should be no less than that which they play in
investigations. If the fundamental basis for the rules of evidence is
a successful development of the truth, then to remove such a valua-
ble piece of evidence from the litigative process would be to hamper
that development substantially.
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